In a previous review, I described the challenge mounted by postmodernism to the assumptions of the rational planning model (Lake, 1992) . But a critique of the positivist assumptions of rational planning did not await the arrival of postmodernism. These assumptions -of analytical and technical objectivity, political neutrality, subject-object dualism, and of a world discernible in terms of lawful regularities -have been under fire for decades from both within and outside the discipline (for a recent summary, see Harper and Stein, 1992) . Healey (1992: 9) , for instance, repeats the observation of numerous commentators who have noted 'the retreat from the positivist tradition with its emphasis on the sole validity of objectified, systematized knowledge coupled with a clear separation of facts from values'. Evidently referring to what she considers to be common knowledge, Healey concludes that 'we now appreciate that technical knowledge is inevitably infused with biases reflecting particular interpretive predilections and normative values'. Recognition of the impossibility of separating facts and values seems to have attained the status of conventional wisdom (Brown, 1987; Christensen, 1986; Enbar, 1983; Hoch, 1992; Innes, 1990; Vtlachs, 1982) .
And yet, precisely as the critique of positivism and rational planning has gained widespread currency, at least within the realm of theoretically inclined geographers and planners, the fields of planning and applied geography have infused rational planning's positivist assumptions with renewed vigour. The institutional and structural reasons for the persistence of rational planning noted by Dalton (1986) some years ago undoubtedly continue virtually unabated (see also Alexander, 1984; . But the unrelenting embrace of the rational model by planning and applied geography is not adequately described merely in terms of the tenacity and inertia of convenient and familiar practices. The rational model has been actively resurrected and rehabilitated by the ascendance of Geographic Information Systems to a position near or at the core of both planning and geography. Heywood (1990: 850) (Clark, 1992) . Where the debate has emerged, it has been marked more by posturing and sabre-rattling than by closely reasoned discourse (Openshaw, 1991; .
We are just beginning to see a serious and constructive engagement of the dilemmas that positivism poses to the development of Geographic Information Systems, although to date this has largely been pursued by commentators outside the GIS establishment (Curry, 1993; Pickles, 1991; 1993) .
Given the claims to disciplinary centrality made by GIS proponents (Chrisman et al., 1989; Openshaw, 1991; Goodchild, 1991a; 1991b) (Healey, 1992: 9), then to fail to recognize implicit values and to persist in claims of neutrality and objectivity are not only methodologically indefensible but also politically suspect and ethically insupportable (Wachs, 1982;  1985; Martin and Martin, 1990 ).
Ethical considerations have received considerable attention in the world of computerized information technology (IT) (Dunlop and Kling, 1991; Fimbel and Burstein, 1990; Forester and Morrison, 1990) . The general principle at stake has been defined by Ladd (1991: 665) (Rule et al., 1991) , and on issues of access to, and control of, information (Batty, 1988; Beaumont, 1992 (Smith, 1992) . In practice, the need for ethical guidelines has been reduced to statements defining the proper behaviour of practitioners in the conduct of their professional roles (Curry, 1991; 1993; Harper and Stein, 1992 Martin, 1990; Dunlop and Kling, 1991; Tiedeman, 1990) .
In short, practitioners are enjoined to use the technology at their disposal to good ends, to prevent its use for harmful ends, and to conduct themselves according to professional standards of practice. The emphasis on regulating personal conduct, however, fails to address the problem of unanticipated and somewhat more indirect negative outcomes that accrue despite the best of intentions. In a cogent review, Klosterman (1992) (Klosterman, 1992: 253) . In addition, computerization may transform the planning process itself by focusing attention on technical issues at the expense of political or ethical questions, and by narrowing analytical attention to questions answerable via the available technology (Klosterman, 1992; Adler, 1987 (Edney, 1991; Onsrud, 1992; Castle, 1992; Kozub, 1992; Tolles, 1992) . Dando (1992) has summarized the 50 state statutes in the USA controlling the terms of access to local municipal GIS databases and products; Lerner (1992) (Thompson, 1992) In what sense, then, is the project of Geographic Information Systems ethically flawed? It is flawed because it relies on a partial and incomplete approach to ethics; because of the ethical consequences of its uncritical adoption of the positivist assumption of subjectobject dualism; and because of its inability to comprehend and respect the subjective differences among the individuals who constitute the irreducible data points at the base of the GIS edifice. These issues are inextricably linked.
I Means and ends
Discussion of GIS applications would be sufficient to resolve the ethical conflicts implicit in Geographic Information Systems if ethics were determined simply on the basis of moral ends. But a moral theory that focuses on ends to the exclusion of means is partial and incomplete.
The moral theory that focuses on ends is known as teleological, or utilitarian, theory (Curry, 1993; Howe, 1992; 1993; Wachs, 1985) .
To a utilitarian, the measure of a good public policy is how much benefit it brings to the public, or the balance of good and bad created ... If a substantial benefit can be produced for the majority, which, nevertheless, imposes 408 costs on a minority, that is an acceptable outcome as long as the aggregate benefits outweigh the aggregate costs (Howe, 1992: 234 (Smith, 1992; Pickles, 1991) .
But in addition to these problems of implementation, utilitarian ethics are also confronted by an alternative, and incompatible, approach to ethics based on fundamental obligations or rights. Such obligations as freedom, justice, equality, and autonomy form the basis of a deontological approach to ethics. From this vantage point, the problem with utilitarian moral theory is that it may justify a policy or practice on consequentialist grounds that nonetheless violates a deeply held notion of individual rights. Howe (1992; 1993) has examined the ethical dilemma facing planners whose adoption of a utilitarian, consequentialist, approach to ethics makes them vulnerable to the problem of ' &dquo;dirty hands&dquo; -the choice about whether to do morally wrong things such as lying, manipulating others, violating rights, or even killing -in order to do good for the public as a whole' (Howe, 1992: 236) .
Thus, within this broader, more encompassing approach to ethics, the concern with directing GIS applications to beneficial ends may satisfy a consequentialist concept of elites while running afoul of deontological principles of rights and obligations. This, too, might be amenable to correction were it not that the violation of individual rights inherent in Geographic Information Systems derives directly from the positivist assumptions underlying the GIS project. Specifically, GIS runs afoul of deontological principles because of its assumption of subject-object dualism and its inability to comprehend subjective differences amongst the objects of its analysis.
IV Subjects and objects
The positivist assumption of subject-object dualism underlying the rational planning model has been wholly absorbed by Geographic Information Systems. This assumption holds that the perspective, viewpoint, and ontology of the researcher are separate -and different -from those of the individuals constituting the data points comprising the GIS database. Curry (1993) (Curry, 1993) . Pickles ( 1991 ) draws from Foucault to describe this process in terms of the 'normalization' of individuals contributing to the exercise of power in society.
Here is where positivist method fails in its encounter with ethics. For the 'other' to be thought of as an object rather than as a person is to deny that person's autonomy: 'In a discourse wherein one speaks of a person as an &dquo;other&dquo;, one quite simply cannot treat that person as an autonomous individual' (Curry, 1993) . But to deny the other's autonomy is to treat that person unethically according to deontological principles of ethics. All the while, of course, the analyst reserves such subjective autonomy, and the consequent expectation of ethical treatment, for his or her own ontological position in the world. This fundamental dilemma holds, of course, regardless of how socially beneficial a particular GIS application may be. This is an institute of a consequentialist objective being achieved through unethical means, that is, by violating a deontological principle of individual rights.
It is in this sense that Howe (1992: 236) The objective data of GIS contrast fundamentally with the feminist conception of subjective difference. Bondi and Domosh (1992) draw a sharp distinction between the objectified knowledge of GIS and the subjectivity of feminism and postmodernism (see also Dear, 1986; . Reprising critiques of positivism, they describe the assumption prevalent in geography (and, it is safe to say, in planning as well) that 'real knowledge is universal, neutral, objective, unproblematically communicable, and singularly true' (Bondi and Domosh, 1992: 202 (Bondi and Domosh, 1992: 202) .
From this 'god's eye view', any given category (gender, race, class, etc.) (Bondi and Domosh, 1992: 203) . As summarized by Pratt (1990: 597) , 'all categories are constructions, all are systems of unity and difference that are created by subjects situated in particular social relations'. Moore-Milroy (1991) explores the planning implications of 'gender specificity' constructed within subjectivities differentiated by gender.
Asymmetrical power relations yield highly distinct, unique, subjective experiences (Pratt, 1992b) . Bondi and Domosh (1992: 207) Pratt (1992a) argues that if knowledge is subjective, and subjectivity is situated and positional, then the position one takes is critical in creating one's knowledgeboth of oneself and of others. This she deems 'the politics of presence -the grounds for finding a speaking position and the possibilities for speaking across differences' (1992a: 241). Pratt thus seeks to make explicit the political implications of positionality, implications relegated to oblivion by the objectifying assumptions of GIS.
VI Tunnel vision?
The complexity introduced by feminist and postmodernist theory has led to Rosalind Deutsche's by now often quoted aphorism that 'the world is not so easily mapped anymore' (quoted in Pratt, 1990: 597 (Chrisman et al., 1989: 778) . Does this presage a grand synthesis of theory and technology, or is that potential to be forever foreclosed by the tunnel vision of positivism?
The prospect is not encouraging. The irony is even more compelling because of the 411 emphasis within GIS on conceptualizing the nature of geographic data (Fotheringham, 1991; Nyerges, 1991) . Describing data modelling as 'perhaps the most significant issue in GIS', Goodchild (1991b: 195) 
